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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter election scheme allows voters to confirm that their
vote is accurately counted whilst maintaining ballot secrecy. Initial
analysis indicates that the scheme is highly trustworthy, due to the
high degree of transparency and auditability. However, the assurance
arguments are subtle and involve some understanding of the role of
cryptography. As a result, there remain challenges regarding public
understanding and trust. It is essential that a voting system be not
only trustworthy but also widely trusted.
In this note, I propose a simple mechanism to generate a conven-
tional paper audit trail that can be invoked should the outcome of the
cryptographic count be called into question. It is hoped that having
such a familiar mechanism as a safety net will encourage public con-
fidence. Care has to be taken to ensure that the mechanism does not
undermine the carefully crafted integrity and privacy assurances of the
original scheme.
1 Introduction
There has been much concern lately as to the trustworthiness of electronic
voting systems such as touch screen devices, where the integrity of the count
depends heavily on the correctness of the code running on the voting ma-
chines. Researchers have pointed out the ease with which the count could
be manipulated in virtually undetectable ways, [6]. One response to these
concerns, originally proposed by Mercury [7], is to incorporate a Voter Veri-
fiable Paper Audit Trail, essentially a paper copy of the voter’s intent that is
printed in the booth and checkable by the voter. Whilst such a mechanism
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is doubtless an improvement on the situation in which the count is retained
solely in software, with no paper back-up at all, there are still problems:
• Paper audit trails are not invulnerable to corruption.
• If the paper record does not agree with the voter’s selection, it may
be tricky to resolve, especially without undermining the privacy of the
ballot.
• It is not clear under what circumstances the audit trail should be
invoked.
• It is not clear how any conflicts between the computer and paper audit
counts should be resolved.
• Humans are notoriously bad at proof-reading, especially their own
material, and hence bad at detecting errors in a record of their choices,
[4].
An alternative response is to devise schemes that provide high levels of
assurance via a high degree of transparency and with minimal dependency
on technology. Such schemes provide Voter-verifiability in a different sense:
voters have a way to confirm that their vote is included in a universally
auditable tabulation that is performed on an append-only Web Bulletin
Board (WBB).
Preˆt a` Voter , [11, 12, 3, 15], is a particularly voter-friendly example of
such high assurance, trustworthy voting schemes. It aims to provide guar-
antees of accuracy of the count and ballot privacy that are independent of
software, hardware etc. Assurance of accuracy flows from maximal trans-
parency of the process, consistent with maintaining ballot privacy.
Verifiable schemes like Preˆt a` Voter, VoteHere, [8], and PunchScan, [1],
arguably provide higher levels of assurance than even conventional pen-
and-paper elections, and certainly far higher assurance than systems that
are dependant on the correctness of (often proprietary) code. However,
the assurance arguments are subtle and it is unreasonable to expect the
electorate at large to follow them. Whether the assurances of experts would
be enough to reassure the various stakeholders is unclear. This is probably
especially true during the early phase of introduction of such systems until
a track record has been established. It seems sensible therefore to explore
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the possibility of incorporating more conventional mechanisms to support
public confidence.
Randell and Ryan, [9], explored the possibility of voter-verifiable schemes
without the use of cryptography. This tried to achieve similar integrity and
privacy goals but using only more familiar, physical mechanisms such as
scratch strips. The resulting levels of assurance, in the technical sense, are
not as high as for Preˆt a` Voter.
A more recent proposal is ThreeBallot due to Rivest, [10]. This does
indeed provide voter-verifiability but at the cost of a non-trivial voter in-
terface: voters a required to mark three ballots with in such a way as to
encode their vote (two votes against their candidate of choice, one against
all others) and to retain one ballot, chosen at random. Besides the non-
trivial voter interface, a number of vulnerabilities in ThreeBallot have been
identified, [2]. It is probably fair to conclude that ThreeBallot, whilst being
a conceptual breakthrough, does not, as it stands, provide a viable scheme
for real elections.
Here I explore a rather different route: supplementing a cryptographic
scheme with a conventional paper audit trail backup. Introducing such a
mechanism may introduce certain vulnerabilities not present in the original
scheme. However, it may be argued that it is worth introducing such risks,
at least during trials and early phases of deployment. In this paper we
propose an approach that we believe minimises such risks whilst maximising
the reassurance of having a conventional mechanism as a backup. Once
sufficient levels of trust and confidence have been established in a verifiable,
trustworthy schemes like Preˆt a` Voter, we would hope that the scaffolding
of a human-readable paper audit trail could be cast aside.
Interestingly, an additional and unexpected benefit of the approach of
this paper is to provide a robust counter to the coercion threats arising from
voters attempting to leave the polling station with the left hand element of
the Preˆt a` Voter ballot. This shows the candidate order and so could provide
a potential coercer with proof of the vote. A number of possible counter-
measures to this threat have been identified previously, but the mechanism
here appears to be particularly robust.
The author previously proposed a Verified Encrypted Paper Audit Trail
(VEPAT) mechanism, [14]. Whilst this enhances assurance from a technical
point of view, the audit trail is not human-readable and so it does not really
improve public perception and confidence. It is hoped that the scheme
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Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voterballot form
proposed here, by virtue of avoiding the use of cryptography, should be
more familiar and understandable.
Firstly I outline the Preˆt a` Voter scheme and then introduce the adap-
tation to human-readable paper audit trail. In Section 3 I describe the
procedures to create the Human-Readable Paper Audit Trail (HRPAT). In
Section 4 I discuss the benefits of such a mechanism and weigh these against
the threats that may be introduced.
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is to encode the vote using
a randomised candidate list. Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the
polling station, Anne chooses at random a ballot form sealed in an envelope;
an example of such a form is shown in Figure 1.
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from the envelope and makes
her selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right hand column
against the candidate of her choice (or, in the case of a Single Transferable
Vote (STV) system for example, she marks her ranking against the candi-
dates). Once her selection has been made, she separates the left and right
hand strips along a thoughtfully provided perforation and discards the left
hand strip. She is left with the right hand strip which now constitutes her
privacy protected receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, registers with an official,
and casts her receipt. Her receipt is placed over an optical reader or similar
device that records the random value at the bottom of the strip and records
in which cell her X is marked. Her original, paper receipt is digitally signed
and franked and returned to her to keep.
The randomisation of the candidate list on each ballot form ensures that
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X7304944
Figure 2: Preˆt a` Voterballot receipt (encoding a vote for ”Idefix”)
the receipt does not reveal the way she voted, so ensuring the secrecy of her
vote. Incidentally, it also removes any bias towards the candidate at the top
of the list that can occur with a fixed ordering.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, that we refer to as the
onion, is the key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this
value is the information needed to reconstruct the candidate order and so
extract the vote encoded on the receipt. This information is encrypted with
secret keys shared across a number of tellers. Thus, only a quorum of tellers
acting together are able to interpret the vote encoded on the receipt.
After the election, voters (or perhaps proxies acting on their behalf)
can visit the secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB) and confirm their receipts
appear correctly. Once any discrepancies are resolved, the tellers take over
and perform anonymising mixes and decryption of the receipts. All the
intermediate stages of this process are committed to the WBB for later
audit. Various auditing mechanisms are in place to ensure that all the
steps, the creation of the ballot forms, the mixing and decryption etc are all
performed correctly. These are carefully designed so as not to impinge on
ballot privacy. Full details can be found in, for example, [15]
3 Incorporating a Human-readable Paper Audit
Trail
Preˆt a` Voter appears to be particularly well suited to the incorporation of a
human-readable paper audit trail. We introduce a two layer format for the
ballot forms. The lower layer is essentially a conventional Preˆt a` Voter ballot
but without the onion value. Instead, this lower layer carries a serial number
that is independent of the onion value.
The upper layer overlays only the RH column and carries the usual onion
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(but not the serial number). It does not show the candidate order. All the
forms are individually sealed in envelopes that have a window through which
only the serial number is visible.
3.1 The Voting Ceremony
The voting ceremony here is very similar to that proposed for conventional
Preˆt a` Voter, as described for example in [15]. Anne arrives at the polling
station and pre-registers, i.e., she presents some form of authentication, is
confirmed as a legitimate voter and is handed a fresh ballot form sealed in
an envelope. The serial number, visible through a window in the envelope,
is recorded by the official against the Anne’s name.
Anne now takes this to a booth, removes the form from the envelope and
marks her choice on the upper layer. A carbon copy style mechanism is used
to transfer a copy of Anne’s marks on the upper layer down to the lower
layer. The upper layer, when detached from the lower, forms the receipt in
the usual fashion. Whilst still in the booth, Anne places the lower layer in
an envelope, which will be available in the booth. These envelopes are so
constructed as to allow the serial number, and only the serial number, to
pop out of a slit and be visible.
Anne now leaves the booth clutching her Preˆt a` Voter receipt and the
sealed envelope containing the lower layer of the ballot form and goes to
the registration desk. She re-registers and her name is marked off as having
voted. The official(s) check that the serial number popping out of the enve-
lope matches that issued at pre-registration. The serial number is detached
and discarded, and the envelope is cast into a (transparent) ballot box in
the presence of the voter and officials.
As usual with Preˆt a` Voter, a digital copy of the receipt is taken posted
to the Web Bulletin Board. Anne retains the original, digitally signed copy
as her receipt. We could also incorporate a VEPAT mechanism at this point
along the lines suggested in [14]. Note that the procedure with the serial
numbers is similar to the known counter-measure to chain voting, [5]. Note
also that the placing of ballots in an envelop and casting this in the presence
of officials is similar to the French voting procedure.
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Figure 3: Modified Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
X
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Figure 4: Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt (encoding a vote for ”Idefix”)
3.2 The Amended Ballot Forms
Initially, the ballot will appear essentially as before except that the serial
number will also be visible at the bottom of the left hand column on the
lower layer, see Figure 3. The upper layer can be detached to give a receipt
of the form shown in Figure 4. The lower layer forms the human-readable
audit copy and has the form shown in Figure 5 and, with the serial number
tag removed, figure 6.
Obelix
Idefix X
Asterix
Panoramix
2774089
Figure 5: Human-readable Preˆt a` Voter ballot form with serial number
attached
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Figure 6: Human-readable Preˆt a` Voter ballot form with serial number
removed
4 Discussion
The mechanism proposed here augments the standard Preˆt a` Voter scheme
with a human-readable (un-encrypted) paper audit trail. In the event of the
usual Preˆt a` Voter count being called into question, a conventional recount
could be performed using the paper ballots. Such recounts could be per-
formed routinely. It is hoped that the availability of such a familiar, easy to
understand mechanism to underpin the cryptographic mechanisms should
bolster public confidence and acceptance.
A concern with Preˆt a` Voter stems from the observation that there may
be a threat of coercion if the voter is be able to retain the LH, candidate
order bearing, portion of the ballot form. Various mechanisms have been
proposed to counter this threat, perhaps the most appealing is to ensure that
the booths have a plentiful supply of decoy strips. The procedure proposed
here has the additional, and unexpected, advantage of helping with this
issue: officials verify that the lower layer of the ballot form, that carries the
candidate order, is surrendered when the vote is cast.
The concept of a human-readable paper audit trail may introduce some
threats to privacy and coercion resistance not present in Preˆt a` Voter. In
particular the presence of the serial number may be dangerous. If a coercer
is able to get sight of ballot forms before they are issued to the voters
and if, furthermore, the coercer can obtain access to the record of serial
numbers against voters, then he will be able to deduce how voters cast their
votes. Careful chain of custody procedures including sealing the ballots in
individual envelopes will counter the first element of this threat. Protecting
the record of voter names against serial numbers would counter the second
element.
On-demand printing of ballots in the booth, in the manner of [13, 16],
may also help to counter these problems. Here, the candidate list is revealed
only to the voter in the booth. Another, simpler approach in this context
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might be to print the serial numbers on to the ballot forms on demand, i.e.,
when the voter pre-registers.
UK electoral law requires that the authorities be able to trace a bal-
lot back to the name used to cast the ballot. Ballot privacy is thus only
conditional in the UK. By slightly amending the procedure above, we can
accommodate it straightforwardly: rather than detaching the serial num-
ber from the lower layer at the time of casting, the serial number is left
attached. Thus the audit trail ballot forms here have essentially the same
role as conventional ballots in the current UK voting system.
Whilst they may have advantages of simplicity and familiarity, paper
audit trails are far from infallible. This raises the danger that a corrupted
paper-audit-trail count lead to a conflict with a Preˆt a` Voter count, even
though the Preˆt a` Voter count is faithful to the votes cast. This raises issues
as to which count is to be regarded as primary. The same issue of course
raises its head with other VVPAT mechanisms.
A further threat is that some voters try to discredit the election by
falsifying the record on the lower layer in order to give rise to inconsistency
between the Preˆt a` Voter count and the audit trail. It would seem that
this would require a major coordinated effort to produce a discrepancy that
would be regarded as significant. However, if this is a serious concern, this
could be countered by having the voter’s marks visible through the envelope
but with the candidate list concealed. Officials would be required to check
the serial number matches that recorded as issues and that the voter’s marks
on the two layers match.
The presence of the serial number on the lower layer could raise concerns,
if only psychological. The purpose of the serial numbers is to enable officials
to check that voters submit the lower layer of the the ballot form that
was issue to them at pre-registration. The procedure proposed requires the
number to be removed at the time of casting. However, concerns might be
raised that the procedure could be circumvented, so leading to a (perceived)
loss of secrecy. In order to completely avoid such concerns, it may be worth
exploring alternative approaches.
We might, for example, consider using anti-counterfeiting, colour coded
forms such that officials can tell at a glance at the time of casting (from
the portion showing through the envelope), that a genuine lower layer is
enclosed. This approach would not guarantee that the enclosed lower layer
was the one originally presented to the voter, in the way that the serial
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numbers do, but this appears to be enough to prevent voters smuggling out
the lower layer.
Care has to be taken not to allow chain-voting threats to sneak in: a
coercer smuggles out a blank form, marks it with his preferred candidate,
intercepts voters entering the polling station and requires that they cast the
marked ballot and emerge with a fresh ballot form. The balance of these
threats and counter-measures will need to be carefully evaluated, and the
judgement may depend on the context.
It may also be worth exploring ways to retain a link between the two
layers of the ballots forms. This could help diagnose and resolve any discrep-
ancies that might arise. Of course, any such link would have to be carefully
protected so that it could only be invoked by appropriate authorities under
well defined circumstances. The possibility of retaining the serial number
on the lower layer suggested earlier of course provides such a capability and
may be acceptable, even mandated, in the UK context. It might be be
deemed unacceptable in other jurisdictions where stronger (cryptographic
rather than procedural) guarantees of privacy might be required.
A possibility might be to use a scratch strip mechanism: the serial num-
ber is over-printed over a scratch strip which is removed by the officials at
the time of casting once the number has been checked to agree with that
issued. Underneath the strip there is another number, possibly encoded in
a non-human-readable form such as a 2D bar code, that is linked crypto-
graphically to the onion value.
One slight complication to consider is the fact that our paper audit trail
is not quite conventional: the candidate orders vary from ballot to ballot.
This means that care would have to be taken during counting. For the
purposes of this paper I am regarding the cryptographic count as primary
and counting of the paper audit trail as fall-back; I will not discuss this
further here.
5 Conclusions
I have presented a simple add-on mechanism to provide a human-readable
paper audit trail in Preˆt a` Voter. This should help instill greater confidence
and trust in the public and the various stakeholders. The mechanism should
not impinge on the assurances of accuracy, except perhaps in the sense that,
if the paper audit trail were corrupted, there could be a conflict between
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the cryptographic count and the count derived from the audit trail. This
might then cast doubt, quite incorrectly, on the integrity of the Preˆt a`
Voter process.
An additional benefit of this scheme, aside from confidence building, is to
provide a counter-measure to the coercion threat arising from the possibility
of the voters retaining the LH portion of a Preˆt a` Voter ballot form. Now
officials check that the lower layer is cast in the envelope, so preventing the
voter retaining it.
More careful analysis is needed to establish precisely what threats against
ballot privacy and coercion resistance might be introduced by such a mech-
anism. In the current proposal we have tried to minimise any such threats,
but clearly they need precise evaluation and weighing off against the benefits
of increased confidence in the integrity of the election.
I hope that such mechanisms could be viewed as a temporary crutch
to help with stakeholder confidence during the evaluation phase and that
these can be jettisoned in due course once the trustworthiness of verifiable
schemes, such a Preˆt a` Voter, has been demonstrated and public confidence
established.
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